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ABSTRACT Crypto-ransomware is a type of malware that encrypts user files, deletes the original data,
and asks for a ransom to recover the hijacked documents. It is a cyber threat that targets both companies
and residential users, and has spread in recent years because of its lucrative results. Several articles have
presented classifications of ransomware families and their typical behaviour. These insights have stimulated
the creation of detection techniques for antivirus and firewall software. However, because the ransomware
scene evolves quickly and aggressively, these studies quickly become outdated. In this study, we surveyed the
detection techniques that the research community has developed in recent years. We compared the different
approaches and classified the algorithms based on the input data they obtain from ransomware actions, and
the decision procedures they use to reach a classification decision between benign or malign applications.
This is a detailed survey that focuses on detection algorithms, compared to most previous studies that offer
a survey of ransomware families or isolated proposals of detection algorithms. We also compared the results
of these proposals.
INDEX TERMS Computer security, malware detection, ransomware.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2018, ransomware dominated the reports on cybercrime,
and became a malware threat targeting both businesses and
users alike. Some reports describe ransomware not only
as a tool of financially motivated criminals, but also for
groups suspected of being aligned to the interests of some
nations [1]. Ransomware has affected a broad spectrum of
companies from manufacturing, transport, and telecommuni-
cations industries, financial companies, public law enforce-
ment, and health services [2], [3].
Ransomware extorts users by locking access to computer
resources and asking for a monetary payment to recover
access. The first reports on ransomware that had a large
impact referred to them as lockscreen ransomware. This
type of malware locks access to a computer. In some
cases, it impersonates law enforcement organisations, ask-
ing for the payment of a fine for some illegal activity per-
formed by the user, such as downloading files or browsing
child pornography websites. These strains are called police
ransomware [4].
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Zahid Akhtar .
Since 2015, police ransomware and lockscreen ran-
somware in general decayed in popularity and were substi-
tuted by a type of ransomware that encrypts user files and
asks for a payment to provide the decryption key. This cryp-
tographic ransomware is called crypto-ransomware or cryp-
toware. Ransomware payments can be carried using social
networks [5]. However, most of them carry the payments
using cryptocurrencies, and 98% of ransomware families use
Bitcoin [6]. Although the reports on their economic impact
are hardly accurate [7], each year single strains of crypto-
ransomware reach new records of extended multi-national
impact. WannaCry and NotPetya attacks in 2017 were esti-
mated to have incurred global costs of more than $8 bil-
lion [8]. During only the first three weeks of 2018, GandCrab
ransomware infectedmore than 50,000 systems. The incurred
costs came not only from ransom payments but also from
the cessation of business operations, the impact on the public
image of affected companies, and insurance consequences.
Not only desktop systems were affected, but also mobile
ransomware increased its impact in 2017 [1]. Antivirus com-
panies reported a three-fold increase in ransomware installa-
tion packages during the first quarter of 2017 compared to the
previous quarter [9], [10]. Since 2018, malware developers
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began to use droppers - trojan software that looks like a
benign program, but once executed, downloads or extracts the
real malware and installs it in a computer [11].
The detection and blockage of crypto-ransomware has
been a very active area of research in recent years, because of
the massive expansion of this form of malware. Proposals and
developments have come from both the industrial sectors and
academia. Most detection solutions run local to a user host,
working like an antivirus software to detect and block ran-
somware activity. However, proposals exist that are based on
detecting ransomware network activity or blocking network
traffic to servers needed by the malware. These detection
algorithms are based on a diversity of ad-hoc heuristics and
artificial intelligence techniques. The simplest solutions are
customised for detecting a single ransomware type; how-
ever, more general proposals are capable of the detection
of zero-day attacks. Our survey covers the case of crypto-
ransomware, and from this point forward, any reference to
ransomware refers to a ransomware that encrypts user files.
No previous complete surveys on ransomware detection
techniques exist because of the novelty of this type of mal-
ware and the fast-paced changing scenario of malware. Most
surveys limited their scope to a description of the behaviour of
different ransomware families [12]–[14] or the ransomware
families were included as a category in a broader study
of malware [15]. The description of detection techniques
is usually short and only in the form of suggestions and
ideas [16], [17] and not formal algorithms. The most com-
plete surveys on the topic are those of Eze et al. [18] and
in particular of Al-rimy et al. [19]. Although Eze et al. [18]
cites several research papers on ransomware detection in a
simple classification, it does not provide a complete review
of the literature, but only a two-page introduction to the
topic. Al-rimy et al. [19] presents an extensive classification
on ransomware behaviour and an up-to-date classification
of detection algorithms in the research literature. However,
he does not provide a description of the input parameters and
classification results provided by these proposals. Further,
he covers the broad topic of ransomware without providing
sufficient detail on the detection algorithms, which is the sole
topic of our review.
In this survey, we reviewed 50 proposals for the detection
of cryptoware activity.Most came from academia, but we also
added the description of existing commercial products based
on the available public information. We present a classifica-
tion based on the behavioural characteristics extracted from
a running system and the mathematical tools used in their
analysis: machine learning (ML)-based and threshold based.
The techniques for ransomware detection are based on dis-
tinguishing ransomware action from benign software. In this
study, we classified ransomware action as different detection
techniques. This is a different classification from those pre-
sented in the literature. An in-depth analysis of ransomware
characteristics is vital to create an accurate detection algo-
rithm. We describe the characteristics of 48 different ran-
somware families from the analysis of 64 collected samples.
We extracted these characteristics from running the actual
samples. The survey papers in the literature describing ran-
somware action had no access to such a large database and
did not offer first-hand analysis. We classify these families
and relate them to the proposed detection techniques.
There are no commonmetrics of accuracy and performance
in ransomware detection. Some studies with a new detection
algorithm compared their proposals with previous ones, but
not all of them, and only to the extent of the ransomware
families they targeted. We describe and compare the results
of all these proposals, and we complete this paper with a
description of unsolved issues.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows:
Section II details the characteristics of the different ran-
somware families from the point of view of the design of
detection algorithms. Section III offers a classification and
description of the input data that the detection algorithms
extracted from ransomware. Section IV groups the detec-
tion algorithms based on the logic of how to use the input
data to obtain a classification decision. We also describe
the main aspects of these algorithms. Section VI presents
the detection and performance results offered in the litera-
ture. Section VII discusses open issues in crypto-ransomware
detection. Section VIII concludes the paper.
II. CHARACTERISTICS OF RANSOMWARE BEHAVIOUR
We obtained more than 60 samples of different ran-
somware programs during a six-year period. We tested
their behaviour in a virtualised environment, analysing their
dynamic behaviour. Based on this analysis, we established a
small number of actions that ransomware performs and clas-
sified ransomware based on the selected actions performed
and their implementation. These actions have been described
in other studies [12], [15]; however, we take the point of view
of the detection algorithm and the characteristics of its use,
which is a different approach. The details of this behaviour
are critical in the design of a ransomware detection algorithm.
Figure 1 presents the five steps of ransomware activity.
We briefly name and describe them as follows:
1) Infection: A victim’s computer is infected. The attack
vectors are shared with other types of malware. They
commonly reach the victim as e-mail-attached files
executed by the user [20]. They can also be downloaded
from infected web pages, taking advantage of web
browser vulnerabilities [20]. Finally, some ransomware
strains implement a worm-like behaviour capable of its
distribution in a Local Area Network (LAN) [21].
2) Contact Command and Control (C&C) servers: The
malware contacts a C&C server to obtain or store the
FIGURE 1. Steps in ransomware activity.
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encryption key. The server can be located using stati-
cally configured Internet Protocol (IP) addresses, static
Domain Name System (DNS) names, or dynamically
generated DNS names.
3) Encryption key management: The encryption key is
obtained from C&C servers or locally generated and
then stored on remote servers. In the last case, Step
2 can take place after Step 3. The malware can also
generate and store the key locally, encrypting it using
the remotely obtained key. The main action in this step
is the local management of encryption keys.
4) Data encryption: The main task of cryptoware is the
encryption of user files, which occurs in this step.
It encrypts and deletes local files, but it can also affect
files and volumes mounted using a network file sharing
protocol. It can also erase backup files or volumes
(for example, shadow copies in Microsoft Windows
systems) and modify the computer startup sequence to
run again if the computer is rebooted.
5) Extortion: The ransomware requests the payment of
a ransom to decrypt the files. It explains to the user
what has occurred and what must be done to recover
the files. It can show a new window with this informa-
tion, include text files in every directory containing the
explanation, or change the desktop background.
Table 1 shows the ransomware families and how they
implement each step from 2 to 5. The detection techniques
take advantage of known ransomware behaviour during one
or more of the above-mentioned steps. In the following sec-
tions we detail the activities taking place in each step and the
corresponding entries in Table 1.
A. INFECTION
The infection step (Step 1) is carried out following the
same procedures as any other malware. The main infection
vectors are:
• Spam: Themalware reaches the user through unsolicited
e-mail. It contains the malware as an attached file. The
content and subject of the e-mail try to be related to per-
sonal or work activities (requests from friends, rebates,
invoices).
• Corrupted web pages: A web page containing benign
files is hacked by the malware author. The files offered
for download (software updates, documents) are substi-
tuted for the malware. The user downloads and executes
the malware while believing it is a benign document.
• Vulnerabilities: The hacker benefits from vulnerabilities
in the user operating system or web browser to deliver
and run the malware to the host.
• Phishing: The content of an e-mail, web page or the
interlocutor on a phone call impersonate a company,
friend, colleague or public service to take the user
to a fake web page and to download and run the
malware.
FIGURE 2. Ransomware infection vector.
Figure 2 shows the distribution of the infection vector for
ransomware strains described in Table 1 [22]–[25]. We refer
to the literature [26], [27] for further detail.
B. CONTACT C&C SERVERS PREVIOUS TO DATA
ENCRYPTION
Step 2 comprises the actions a ransomware performs which
require Internet access and are previous to the data encryption
phase. It contacts a C&C server or a cluster of servers. AC&C
server is an Internet host or set of hosts that manage malware
actions, distribute commands, and collect information from
victims [28].
This is not a necessary step previous to the encryption
phase. Ransomware can generate a local key for a symme-
tric key encryption algorithm, encrypt target files, and then
store the key on a C&C server. It can also locally store the
encryption key and never contact an external server. In that
case, the key is encrypted using a public key from an asym-
metric pair so that only the attacker can decrypt it using the
corresponding private key. Therefore, the host needs only to
contact the hacker when the user asks for the decryption key.
These attack patterns are vulnerable because the decryption
key is in the victim’s host in some moment and form (in local
disk or maybe only in RAM before it is encrypted).
Ransomware strains such as CTBLocker and DMALocker
do not contact servers previous to the encryption phase.
However, we obtained 17 ransomware strains that contacted
external servers previous to the data encryption phase. Some
of them obtained a key from an asymmetric pair from a
C&C server and encrypted the files using this key. This
method ensures that the decryption key is never stored in the
infected host; therefore, it cannot be obtained by the antivirus
program.
Ransomware actions during this phase imply the gen-
eration of network traffic contacting external servers, not
requested by user actions. This network traffic is used by
some analysis techniques to detect a ransomware in action.
We considered the following four categories of ransomware
behaviour (Figure 3) based on the actions taken in this step.
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TABLE 1. Examples of ransomware families and characteristics.
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FIGURE 3. Ransomware C&C contact methodologies.
1) NO CONTACT TO C&C
For file encryption, the ransomware can use a public key
from an asymmetric pair, being the private one known only
to the attacker. However, public key encryption is usually
slower than encryption using a shared-key algorithm. Some
ransomware strains create a key for a symmetric encryption
algorithm and store the key within the file (a different key for
each file). In this scenario, the only information encrypted
using public key cryptography is the key for the symmetric
key algorithm [29]. File decryption requires the private key
to decrypt the symmetric key used for encrypting the file.
No communication is required previous to the data encryp-
tion phase, because the public key is included within the
ransomware binary.
Families taking this approach are CTBLocker,
DMALocker Jigsaw, Bart, Spora, KillDisk, Sage2.0, Patcher,
Revenge, BTCWare, Crysis, NotPetya, GlobeImposter,
Ryuk, Scarab, LockerGoga, and BadRabbit [23], [29]–[37].
These ransomware strains cannot be detected by network
traffic previous to the loss of data files.
2) STATIC IP ADDRESSES OF C&C SERVERS
The ransomware knows the static IP address used by the C&C
server. It can be a list of addresses. Some of them can continue
working even after a firewall blocks access to addresses that
have been detected as malware related. Ransomware using
static IP addresses is only effective in a zero-day scenario.
As the C&C server addresses are discovered (from network
traffic or from the ransomware binary), they can be added to
firewall blacklists, rendering the malware ineffective.
Chimera ransomware [38] shows this behaviour.
3) STATIC DNS DOMAINS FOR C&C SERVERS
Instead of knowing the IP address of a C&C server, the ran-
somware knows its DNS name (or a list of names). Similar to
the case with static IP addresses, this method is vulnerable to
the analysis of the ransomware binary. The list of DNS names
can be extracted from the binary file and added to black lists in
theDNS servers. This was the case in the infamousWannaCry
attack [22].
This is a very common approach used by more than 30 ran-
somware families we analysed (Table 1).
4) DYNAMICALLY GENERATE DOMAIN NAMES
The ransomware does not contain a list of domain names
to locate a C&C server but a Domain Generation Algo-
rithm (DGA). This algorithm creates pseudo-random domain
names that it tries to resolve to obtain the IP address from
a C&C server. The attacker knows the algorithm and the
seed used in the random generation and can predict the
names it will check and reserve those names in advance.
Since the names change, blacklisting a list of names becomes
infeasible.
The drawback in this strategy from the attacker’s point of
view is the long time it takes for the ransomware to generate
an active domain name and to contact a server. This time
provides a window of opportunity for ransomware detec-
tion previous to the phase of data encryption. TeslaCrypt,
TorrentLocker and Locky [39]–[41] are three ransomware
families that use a DGA. Some ransomware detection pro-
posals which focused on detecting a random pattern in DNS
requests to detect the activity of these families will be
described here.
C. ENCRYPTION KEY MANAGEMENT
The type of encryption algorithm used by a ransomware
and the key management strategy determine the presence of
the decryption key in a user’s machine. Anti-ransomware
software running on an infected host can detect the presence
of the key and retain it. However, by using asymmetric cryp-
tography, the ransomware can keep the decryption key away
from the user’s host. Therefore, both the type of encryption
algorithm and the key management strategy are critical in
anti-ransomware software design. In this section, we describe
the options on both axes. Their implementation in the differ-
ent ransomware families is summarised in Table 1.
1) ENCRYPTION ALGORITHMS
Both symmetric and asymmetric key algorithms are used in
different types of ransomware. Symmetric key algorithms
such as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) provide
faster encryption than asymmetric key algorithms such as
RSA-2048. Using a simpler algorithm, the ransomware can
finish its encryption task earlier, thereby reducing the time
interval during which it can be detected by the user. Simpler
encryption also allows the ransomware to consume less com-
puting resources, which can keep it undetected by the user
while it is encrypting files.
The main disadvantage of symmetric key algorithms is
that the decryption key is the same as the encryption key.
Therefore, the decryption key is present in the host computer
while the ransomware is encrypting files. The ransomware
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removes this key from the host when it has finished using it
in the encryption phase. It can keep it in the host but only
after encrypting it using a public key whose private key is
only known by the attacker. In any case, an anti-ransomware
software running on a user’s host can detect the presence of
the encryption key and obtain it.
2) KEY GENERATION AND DISTRIBUTION
Ransomware can obtain the key from C&C servers or gen-
erate it locally. In these scenarios, when the ransomware
generates cryptographic keys, it uses system function calls
that provide this service (e.g. the CryptGenRandom function
in a Windows system). Anti-ransomware software can detect
this function call and stop the calling process. However,
as benign software may also use these function calls, it is
a better strategy to store any key generated in the system
in case it was used by malware. However, this can pose
confidentiality problems to benign software because the keys
have been retained.
Ransomware strains DMA Locker, Chimera, Locky,
Cerber, Bart, BTCWare, WannaCry, NotPetya, and BadRab-
bit [22], [23], [25], [42]–[46] are known to use the CryptGen-
Random function for the generation of encrypting keys.
The safest procedure for ransomware is to use a public key
for file encryption. The pairing private key should only be
known by the attacker. Ransomware can contain the public
key in its binary with the disadvantage of being a common
key for any infected user. In a smarter strategy, the public key
is user-specific and obtained from C&C servers previous to
the encryption phase. The attacker keeps the corresponding
private key in its servers and can release it after ransom pay-
ment. Using this strategy, key retrieval is impossible because
the decryption key never leaves the attacker’s computers.
D. DATA ENCRYPTION
The main task in a ransomware lifecycle is encrypting the
content of user files, rendering them unusable unless the
user pays a ransom to obtain the decryption key. During the
encryption phase, the user can notice ransomware activity
as the files are being modified; therefore, to be effective,
this task must be completed in the shortest amount of time.
However, fast encryption requires CPU resources, which can
also betray the ransomware. Therefore, there exists a tradeoff
between a high CPU load and longer encryption time, both of
which help ransomware detection.
To reduce the CPU load and encryption time, a ransomware
can encrypt only a limited number of bytes in each file.
The rest of the file is untouched. Although part of the
user’s information is unencrypted in the file, most file for-
mats become corrupted and are difficult to recover, even the
unencrypted part.
Anti-ransomware monitoring software can monitor user
files and detect file content corruption. By checking only the
first bytes in a file (the magic bytes), a file type can usually
be detected. The ransomware encrypts the entire file, there-
fore changing the magic bytes. However, famous strains like
Cerber [47] keep the magic bytes unencrypted, hampering
detection techniques based on the checking of these bytes.
As the final phase in file modification, some ransomware
strains change the file extension, while others maintain the
original extension. These changes can be used to detect ran-
somware activity. Table 1 details some of these behaviours in
the data encryption step.
E. EXTORTION
To reveal itself to the user, the malware asks for payment of
a ransom. The most frequent technique is the creation of text
files, HTML documents, or image files inside the directories
where the files were encrypted. In these files the hacker
informs the user as to what has occurred and what the user
must do to recover one’s files. Some strains of ransomware
use system calls to change the computer desktop background
or lock access to the computer and show only the ransom
information.
The extortion phase does not always take place once all the
files are encrypted. Ransomware can create information files
in each directorywhere it has encrypted files when all the files
in the directory have been corrupted. Therefore, the detection
of ransomware activity based on this method of informing the
user is feasible, although the ransomware detection is usually
too late to be effective.
III. INPUT INFORMATION FOR
RANSOMWARE DETECTION
The techniques proposed by the industry and academia for
ransomware detection extract information from the suspected
malware before it runs (or while it is running). This infor-
mation is used for the classification as benign or malign
software.
In this section, we present a classification of the parameters
and information extracted from ransomware behaviour. They
are related to the different ransomware activities described in
Section II. We grouped more than 16 parameters related to
previous activities into 3 sets in the first classification level.
We differentiated information extracted locally to the infected
machine (static or dynamic information) from information
extracted from network traffic (Figure 4). The three cate-
gories discussed in the following subsections are:
1) Local static: The information is extracted from the mal-
ware binary before it runs and can be obtained before
launching the malware.
2) Local dynamic: The data is extracted while the program
is running based on the actions it takes on the infected
computer.
3) Network based: The information comes from the net-
work traffic created by the running malware.
Table 3 shows a list of scientific references on ran-
somware detection and the types of input information each
one requires. In the following subsections we describe the
different levels of classification in the three above-mentioned
categories.
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FIGURE 4. Ransomware detection tool classification based on input data.
A. LOCAL STATIC INFORMATION
A detection algorithm based only on local static parameters
is capable of detecting malware before it runs. An effective
algorithm based only on local static parameters is the most
effective and avoids any loss of user data.
A common technique used in commercial antivirus soft-
ware is to obtain the local static parameters from the anal-
ysis of the program binary. However, some ransomware
strains [24] use code obfuscation techniques or a polymorphic
behaviour [48], which hinders detection. The static infor-
mation obtained from the files is related to text strings or
function calls.
1) TEXT STRINGS
Common strings found in ransomware binaries are ‘‘ran-
som’’, ‘‘bitcoin’’, or ‘‘encrypt’’. It can also contain well-
known domain names or IP addresses. The anti-malware
software can search for keywords or set phrases [49], [50].
It is usually complemented with a deeper analysis of static
or dynamic parameters because the method is prone to false
positive alerts.
2) FUNCTION CALLS
The most common function calls found in ransomware pro-
grams are related to cryptography algorithms (key generation,
encryption, and decryption) and file access. Binary inspection
can detect the use of these suspect function calls. They can
be functions from well-known dynamic system libraries or
statically linked libraries.
B. LOCAL DYNAMIC INFORMATION
Local dynamic parameters are extracted once the malware is
running. They present the disadvantage of the requirement
to run untrusted software. However, dynamic parameters are
more difficult to obfuscate because the ransomware has no
option but to take action. For example, it can avoid using
TABLE 2. Local dynamic information used in different detection
algorithms.
system calls for key management or use a new encryption
algorithm; however, it cannot avoid opening, reading, and
writing to files.
Dynamic information can be statistical in nature; therefore,
it requires collecting samples of ransomware actions during
a certain interval of time. During this period, the malware is
running free and can perform irreversible destructive actions.
Therefore, the data collection phase must be short, and the
blocking decision must be made before further loss of user
files. However, it cannot be too short as to provide erroneous
input data to the detection algorithm and thus render a wrong
decision. Ignoring real malware (false negative) and blocking
benign software (false positive) must be considered as fatal
algorithm errors.
We grouped the local dynamic parameters into three cate-
gories (Table 2):
1) Data access information: These parameters are related
to the modification of the content in user files.
2) Metadata access information: Theymeasure the actions
taken by the ransomware on user files, not the content
of the files, but how and when the files were modified.
3) Function calls: They measure the actual library or sys-
tem functions called by the suspect process.
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1) DATA ACCESS INFORMATION
While a malware is running, analysis software can extract
information about how the data in user files are being
accessed and modified. This extracted information is based
on the detection of new encrypted content.
a: MODIFICATION OF MAGIC BYTES OR FILE FORMAT
MODIFICATION
Frequently, a file format can be recognised by a short number
of bytes at the beginning of the file (magic bytes). A pro-
gram that modifies the content of a file (e.g. editing a text
document) does not change the file format. A program that
encrypts a file overwrites its content, changing the bytes that
characterise the file format.
An encryption action can be detected bywatching themod-
ification of the first bytes in modified files. This technique is
prone to false positives because common file formats modify
this section of file content.
b: ENTROPY
Statistically, encrypted data looks like uniformly distributed
random bytes. When a file is written or overwritten, the new
content can be checked for randomness. This can be accom-
plished by intercepting system calls used for file access.
A frequently used metric is entropy. Equation 1 shows a
common definition of entropy in file content where PBn is
the probability of byte value n appearing in a file, although








There is no absolute entropy value that differentiates
encrypted from non-encrypted content. An ad-hoc threshold
for entropy value must be determined. False positive alarms
may occur if this parameter alone is used in ransomware
detection. This is not only owing to benign encryption tools,
but also because many file formats use compression tech-
niques. A compressed file may be statistically similar to an
encrypted file and lead to an incorrect conclusion.
Entropy computation is based on the analysis of the entire
file, taking an important toll on CPU usage. It can also add
stress to the disk if the anti-malware software analyses the
content of all recently modified files instead of intercepting
system calls.
c: FILE DIFFERENCES
The encrypted version of a file should not provide any infor-
mation regarding the unencrypted data. When a file is over-
written, the new content can be compared to the old content.
This comparison requires intercepting the file access system
calls. If the file is substantially modified, it can be a suspect
action because it may be owing to the encryption of the file.
If a ransomware writes the encrypted data to a different file,
it is much more difficult to correlate read data to written data
for comparison purposes.
File differences are prone to trigger false positive alarms
when a benign program substantially modifies a file. These
differences can be combined with entropy computation
because both parameters require the analysis of file content.
d: FILES OVERWRITTEN OR REMOVED
Any modification of file content can be treated as possibly
dangerous. When a file is deleted or its content is modified,
user data are lost. File access system calls can be inter-
cepted, and these two situations can be detected. Most benign
software modifies files; therefore, this parameter cannot be
used alone. However, this is an action that ransomware must
perform. To be effective at asking for a ransom, the original
user data must be removed.
e: FILE EXTENSION MODIFICATION
Most ransomware strains use a specific file extension for
encrypted files. They either create new files with a new file
name or they overwrite the original file and rename it or
change the file name extension.
The file name extension can be checked using a list of
well-known extensions used by ransomware. This is a simple
procedure, not CPU intensive, and commonly used by com-
mercial anti-virus software.
A file name extension can be considered as file metadata.
We consider a file name as data because it is part of the data
provided by the user at file creation and must be protected
against ransomware actions. For example, the file creation
time is not actively provided by a user and usually does not
require protection.
2) METADATA ACCESS INFORMATION
We consider access to file metadata as any action that does
not require file content. This information can be obtained
by intercepting file system calls, but it does not require the
analysis of file data; therefore, less CPU time is required for
its computation.
a: FREQUENCY OF FILE SYSTEM CALLS
All analysed ransomware strains attempt to encrypt as many
files as possible in the shortest amount of time. They pro-
duce a pattern of very frequent file system operations read-
ing, writing, deleting, or renaming files. A time series with
these file operations can be obtained and analysed to dis-
tinguish a file access pattern characteristic of ransomware
action.
The analysis of this type of information is common to
many anti-ransomware proposals. Its main drawback is the
requirement of deciding a frequency or pattern of file access
that distinguishes between benign and malign software. This
can be accomplished by an analysis of previous typical
user file access patterns. However, even though the common
user behaviour may be very different from the ransomware
behaviour, there exist situations where in a short time they
may be very similar. For example, when a user compresses
a directory of files and removes the original files, the entire
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operation may be taken as ransomware action from the point
of view of frequency of file operations and file deletions.
b: NUMBER OF ACCESSED FILES
Ransomware tries to access all user files in a volume, or at
least those documents whose file type indicates that they
are user files (for example, a user would not typically pay
a ransom to recover encrypted operating system files). The
number of files accessed by a malware is large even in a
short time. In comparison, user actions are typically slower
and do not alter many files in a few seconds. However, there
are exceptions; for example, a user may work on a batch
of files using editing software. There are also exceptions to
ransomware accessingmanyfiles in a short time; for example,
if it is encrypting a very large file or it attempts to hide its
activity by slowing down its actions.
c: DIRECTORIES ACCESSED
Ransomware encrypts user files from any directory and
accesses a large amount of paths. It commonly begins by
listing the entire tree of files in a volume or at least those files
with a set of types. It is uncommon that benign applications
access files from a large quantity of different directories;
therefore, this behaviour can be used to differentiate between
benign and ransomware activity.
d: CANARY FILES
Some anti-malware tools create files in the user directories.
These ‘‘canary’’ files are watched by a monitoring tool. The
user is not expected to access these files. If these files are
modified, it may be the result of destructive malware; there-
fore, if the tool identifies the process that altered the file, it can
alert the user or block the malware.
To achieve early ransomware detection, an anti-malware
tool must spread canary files throughout most of the directo-
ries containing user files. Therefore, not only does it clutter
user directories, but it requires monitoring the modification
of a large number of files.
3) FUNCTION CALLS
The most common actions taken by ransomware are related
to encryption and key generation. System functions or library
functions are used for these tasks. Ransomware detection
software can monitor the frequent use of a set of sensible
functions and mark a process as dubious.
Cryptographic keys can also be recognised in process
memory owing to its structure. Monitoring software can
inspect process memory searching for keys and alert the user
or keep a copy of the key. This last option is only useful in the
case of symmetric key encryption or public key encryption,
where the decryption key is present in the system. Using
public key encryption, the private key can be isolated from
the user host; therefore, although a key may be located in
memory, and it may be used to raise an alarm, the decryption
key would not be available.
C. INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM
NETWORK TRAFFIC
Common infection patterns require Internet access (e-mail-
attached files and malicious websites). Some ransomware
samples do not require further network access once they
infect a host. However, most ransomware strains require
Internet access to operate. They retrieve keys from C&C
servers or they store locally generated keys there.
Network traffic can be obtained at an infected host or at
the local network Internet access link. Anti-malware software
can analyse this traffic and detect ransomware action. If the
action is previous to the data encryption phase, it can block
the ransomware before it takes destructive actions. This is
most effective if it blocks the ransomware while attempting
to obtain an encryption key from C&C servers because this
prevents the ransomware from encrypting files.
After reviewing the proposals in the literature, we grouped
the information obtained from traffic analysis into three
groups. Two are based on the analysis of DNS queries, while
the third encompasses a large number of parameters that can
be extracted from network traffic.
1) DETECTION OF DNS QUERIES FOR STATIC NAMES
Ransomware software can contain the C&C server IP address
in its binary; however, this is an uncommon practice as it
makes it vulnerable to network filtering once these addresses
are discovered. A more common practice is the dynamic
location of a C&C server based on the resolution of a domain
name hardcoded in the ransomware binary. The name to
address relation can be changed dynamically by a hacker to
avoid IP filtering.
Table 1 shows 32 ransomware families that locate C&C
servers based on the resolution of a DNS name. This detection
technique can block ransomware before it destroys files if the
name resolution occurs before the encryption phase. How-
ever, it requires the knowledge of the domain names to block,
which are extracted from the analysis of the ransomware
in action in other hosts or the analysis of its binary file.
Therefore, it cannot be used in a zero-day scenario.
2) DETECTION OF DNS QUERIES FOR DYNAMICALLY
GENERATED NAMES
For ransomware strains that use a DGA, blocking the reso-
lution of certain domain names is useless. The ransomware
can attempt the resolution of dozens of pseudo-randomly
generated domain names before it finds a valid one. However,
the characteristic of sending a large number of DNS requests
asking for names that look like a random set of characters can
be used to detect this type of activity.
It is unusual that a real DNS name would be random,
because they are created to be easily remembered by humans.
Statistical information can be extracted from the domain
names requested, and a degree of randomness in them can
be detected. If the randomness can be determined before the
ransomware resolves a valid name, then it can be blocked
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TABLE 3. Ransomware detection tools and input information used.
before it starts removing files. This can be a useful technique
in a zero-day scenario because it does not require extracting
information from a known ransomware. However, it is only
successful against strains that use a DGA.
3) GENERAL TRAFFIC
A ransomware detection algorithm can use statistics extracted
from network traffic. There are tools that take into account
the number of different IP addresses accessed, the number
of different server ports, and the number of sessions from
different application level protocols. These parameters can
enhance the decisions taken by a ML algorithm; however,
they are never used as the sole input statistic.
In corporate environments, document storage is accom-
plished using shared network volumes. Most ransomware
strains are capable of encrypting files stored on the network-
mounted volumes in the infected hosts. The network traffic
created by reading, writing, and destroying files can be used
for ransomware detection.
IV. RANSOMWARE DETECTION ALGORITHMS
The ransomware detection algorithms proposed in the lit-
erature use one or more of the parameters described in
Section III, and decide whether to classify the software as
benign or malign. In this section, we describe the different
proposals on how to reach this decision. We provide a brief
description of each algorithm and its target environment.
In Section VI we discuss the results obtained from each
proposal in terms of successful detection, false detection, and
resources required. We also discuss the limitations of each
technique.
We grouped the algorithms based on the generic character-
istics of their design. In Section IV-A we describe algorithms
based on the combination of different input parameters. These
algorithms provide a numeric risk value which, based on a
threshold, determines whether software actions are classified
as ransomware. This procedure requires tuning themathemat-
ical combination of the input parameters and establishing the
threshold. In Section IV-Bwe describe the proposals based on
the application of ML algorithms to different sets of statis-
tics extracted from ransomware action. ML techniques are
usually supervised and therefore require a previous training
phase. Finally, Section IV-C groups the proposals based on
specific ransomware behaviour without the combination of
numerical metrics. This last group presents ad-hoc detection
procedures.
Table 3 shows the references from the scientific literature,
the input parameters each one requires, and the type of detec-
tion algorithm based on the classification presented in this
section.
A. COMBINATIONAL TECHNIQUES
Most parameters described in Section 3 alone can result in
the erroneous judgement of benign software as ransomware.
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For example, a process that encrypts files can be legitimate,
but the function calls it uses may result in its classification
as ransomware. A program that accesses many files and
removes them like malware may be a harmless compression
utility. A program that overwrites a large number of files
may be a photo edition tool applying a filter to a set of
images. However, a program that accesses many files spread
throughout many different directories and removing them
and creating new files with random-looking content is less
likely to be benign software (although it still may be). The
more actions taken into account and the more of them present
in malware activity, the higher the successful identification
rate. However, collecting all these actions requires giving
permission to the malware to run freely for a long time, long
enough to encrypt and destroy several files.
The ransomware detection proposals presented in this
section are a combination of a subset of parameters from
those described in Section III and Figure 4. These parameters
provide a numerical measure of software dynamic activity.
These measurements are combined to create a single value
that characterises process activity. Based on predetermined
thresholds for this combined measurement or for each value,
the process can be labelled as benign or ransomware.
Scaife et al. described in [59] software that measured disk
access actions from each process while it was running. The
analysis software grouped its input measurement parameters
into primary and secondary indicators, being the three pri-
mary indicators more reliable for malware identification. All
primary indicators must occur for the process to be classified
as ransomware. As primary indicators, it used the identifi-
cation of changes in file format (based on the ‘‘file’’ utility
and the ‘‘magic bytes’’), a quantitative comparison of the
original and modified files, and an entropy measurement of
the created files. The secondary indicators were the number
of files deleted and the diversity of types in files read by the
process. The risk evaluation for a process was incremented
with time as a process performs actions in some of these
parameters classified as dangerous. When this risk value
reached a certain threshold, an alert was triggered and disk
access was blocked for the process. However, there was no
description of the determination of the threshold values.
Paik et al. [63] investigated the special behaviour of Solid
State Disks (SSDs) where the data were not deleted when
overwritten; they were deleted later, on a garbage collection
action. They suggested introducing in SSDs the measurement
of read-and-rewrite and deletion requests, and comparing the
ratio of these actions to a threshold to detect a ransomware
attack. They did not provide details regarding the dynamic
measurement, threshold computation, or evaluation of the
achievable results.
The anti-ransomware software described by Kharraz and
Kirda in [61] was based on at least half a dozen input param-
eters related to the disk access actions performed by a process.
From a file content perspective, it measured the variation in
entropy from a read to a write request in the same section
of a file; it also monitored the proportion of file content
overwritten and whether the process deleted files. The solu-
tion presented also collected metadata information regarding
disk access actions. It checked whether a process accessed
a large number of files with write privileges and whether
the accessed files were from very different file types (from
very different applications) or from the same one. In addition,
it monitored the time between write requests and assigned
a larger risk value the shorter the time. All these measured
process features were combined to offer a risk assessment
using a linear function. The weights in this function were
determined by recursive feature elimination.
Moore [53] set a honeypot where file changes were mon-
itored and different levels of alarm were triggered based on
the threshold reached. Parameter and threshold configuration
was obtained from the average normal activity over a day;
however, no description was provided as to the determination
of normal activity. The threshold values simply doubled nor-
mal average values. No validation against real ransomware
was provided.
The method presented by Mbol et al. [51] restricted vigi-
lance to image files (JPEG format). It measured the number
of image files opened and the difference between the read and
written versions. JPEG format contains compression charac-
teristics, making it difficult to differentiate from an encrypted
file using, for example, the entropy value of file content. The
proposal used the Kullback-Lieber divergence to compare an
original file and a possibly encrypted file. The thresholds for
ransomware detection were decided by trial and error using
TorrentLocker as the ransomware under analysis.
In [73], we measured network traffic between an infected
computer and network shared volumes by measuring the
number of bytes read and written as well as file content
destroyed. These values are combined and checked against
thresholds precomputed to achieve 100% identification for
the available ransomware samples and minimum false pos-
itive events in the case of benign activity in a real scenario.
The previous proposals targeted the Microsoft Windows
environment, while Song et al. [64], Andronio et al. [74],
and Chen et al. [75] focused on ransomware detection in an
Android cell phone operating system. The HelDroid proposal
of Andronio et al. [74] combined the detection of threatening
text in the binary or network traffic with a static analysis of
the software searching for file access followed by encryption
and deletion. This was combined with heuristics attempting
to detect procedures to lock access to the device. In [64],
Song et al. suggested monitoring any activity on a set of pro-
tected files, warning the user when a non-authorised process
attempted to access any of those files. It also monitored CPU,
memory, and disk usage, warning the user when a threshold
was exceeded. No information was provided regarding how
the time-varying statistical measurements should be taken or
the thresholds computed. The proposal from Chen et al. [75]
differed substantially. It was based on the monitoring of writ-
ten files and detecting whether they were encrypted using the
computation of file content entropy. Once a new encryption
process was detected, the user interface was analysed to
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determine whether it was the result of user actions or
unknown to the user and therefore the result of encrypting
ransomware.
B. MACHINE LEARNING-BASED PROPOSALS
ML techniques differ from combinational methods because
they typically use a much larger number of input parameters,
a complex combination of them, and automatic training pro-
cedures for computing the weights in the combination. The
ransomware detection studies based onML have used mainly
supervised learning techniques; however, some unsupervised
proposals exist.
Continella et al. developed in [70] Microsoft Windows
kernel modules which monitored process file system actions
such as folder listing; files read, renamed, or written; and file
entropy in write operations. They collected disk access data
from benign applications running on computers from 11 vol-
unteers and ransomware activity data from samples running
in a controlled virtualised environment. They observed the
data in different time scales to detect ransomware based on
short-term and long-term behavioural patterns. The classifier
for each scale was the random forest supervised learning
algorithm.
The EldeRan proposal from [50] was based on the appli-
cation of a supervised regularised logistic regression ML
algorithm to a large set of features obtained from static and
dynamic analysis of a suspect program. The training phase
occurred offline after monitoring goodware and malware
software in a sandbox environment. More than 30,000 fea-
tures were extracted related to Windows API calls, registry
key operations, file and directory operations, newly cre-
ated (dropped) files, and strings present in the binary. Using
feature selection based on amutual information criterion [76],
the set was reduced to 400 features while maintaining the best
results.
In [67], Hasan and Rahman used a Support Vector
Machine (SVM) classifier as the machine learning algo-
rithm. More than sixty thousand features were extracted from
static and dynamic operations (API calls, registry operations,
file system operations, process operations, network actions).
Similar to [50], a mutual information criterion was used
to reduce the number of features to around 600. In [58]
Chen et al. obtained more than 70,000 features from the
flow graph of API calls used by the suspect process. They
applied correlation techniques to reduce the dimensionality
and compared the results using a Random Forest, a Support
Vector Machine, Simple Logistic algorithm and the Naive
Bayes. Meanwhile, 2entFOX from [71] used twenty different
features, from cryptographic API calls to Windows registry
modification, to design a Bayesian network.
Lu et al. [66] used the V-detector; a negative selection algo-
rithm for classification. This supervised learning algorithm
was inspired by the behavior of biological immune systems.
The authors used features extracted from the API functions
employed, network operations or memory patterns from the
ransomware process. The number of features was reduced
using a low variance filter, which eliminated features with
variances below a given threshold.
Vinayakumar et al. [55] used the Windows API calls from
the process and their frequencies as the sole input features
for the ML classifier. Both an SVM classifier and a multi-
layer perceptron were trained. Chadha and Kumar [77] com-
pared the classification results from several supervised and
unsupervised algorithms, however, the only feature used as
input was the set of domain names generated, trying to detect
families of ransomware which used a Domain Generation
Algorithm.
The proposal from Alam et al. [56] was based on the
observation of the hardware performance counters present in
modern processors. These are special registers that account
for the frequency of different machine-level operations taken
by the CPU. The goal was to detect high encryption activities
based on the CPU events that occurred for these operations.
When no ransomware was running, the sampled values from
these counters were used for an autoencoder, an artificial
neural network used in an unsupervised learning algorithm.
No data from ransomware examples were provided in the
training phase and their detection was based on detecting an
anomaly that deviated from learned behavior.
Moussaileb et al. [54] analysed the file system traversal
action performed by the ransomware to locate files to encrypt.
They suggested using decoy (canary) directories, i.e. direc-
tories that should not be accessed by benign processes but
are a target for ransomware. They compared the classifica-
tion results from a Random Forest, a decision tree and the
k-nearest neighbours algorithm.
There have been proposals which have not included every
measured feature as an input to the ML algorithm but were
designed with a hybrid approach of ML detection, thresh-
old based detection, and ad-hoc mechanisms. For example,
Mehnaz et al. [72] used anML algorithm for the classification
based on file access primitives (rapidly opened, read and
written files). They complemented the detection system with
the use of canary files and monitored file encryption as an
increase in file-content entropy. They selected a Random For-
est classifier after testing other options like Decision Trees,
Naive Bayes or Logistic Regression.
Proposals like RansomWall [49] resorted to a machine
learning classification only when a certain number of features
were detected in the suspect process. The authors inspected
the program binary before execution, checking the use of
certain API calls and text strings. They also tracked the access
and modifications to canary files and directories. When a
certain number of features were present, they used an ML
algorithm for the final process classification. They tested the
results using supervised algorithms like Logistic Regression,
Support Vector Machines, Artificial Neural Networks, Ran-
dom Forests and Gradient Tree Boosting.
Almashhadani et al. [39] described a detection system that
extracted the features exclusively from network traffic. The
authors obtained twenty features from the characteristics of
TCP, HTTP and DNS traffic. They built a decision making
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module based on two classifiers. One classifier was based
on per-packet features, while the second one was based on
flow-based features. It did not require that both classifiers
detected the ransomware. The classifiers evaluated were Ran-
dom Forests, Bayes Networks, Support Vector Machines and
Random Trees. The algorithm that provided the highest accu-
racy was selected for each classifier.
Machine learning algorithms have also been applied to
crypto-ransomware detection in the Android operating sys-
tem. R-PackDroid [78] counts the number of uses of differ-
ent system API packages in the binary program. Based on
these data, a Random Forest is used to classify the samples
into three possible classes: benign, ransomware or generic
malware. Karimi and Moattar’s [79] ransomware detection
method was also based on the analysis of an Android binary.
It calculated the proportion of occurrences of each possible
operation in the Android Dalvik Opcode language. They used
LDA (Latent Dirichlet Allocation) as an image reduction and
classification technique.
Lee et al. [52] used ML techniques to detect encrypted
files before they were copied to a backup filesystem. In their
proposal, the training phase was implemented at the backup
system. It classified files from different users and file types
and decided threshold values for file entropy. These thresh-
olds were sent to the client hosts to decide whether a new
version of the file was encrypted or not. They used three
different methods of entropy computation as input data to the
ML algorithm and compared the results from Decision Trees,
k-Nearest Neighbours, Kernel Support Vector Machines and
the Multi-Layer Perceptron.
Some commercial security and backup software solutions
have introduced machine learning algorithms into their pro-
cess. RansomFlare [80] and Acronis True Image [81] are
examples we have found. Although the developers offered
little information regarding the tools, in the case of [80],
we know they were based on the actions performed by the
analysed software and on SVM for the classification task.
C. AD-HOC PROPOSALS
The proposals of the studies in this section used the knowl-
edge of specific behaviour in ransomware samples and are
valid only for a few ransomware families. In some cases,
they measured sufficient software characteristics to take into
account different behaviours.
Static analysis of a binary in search of specific patterns
is the most usual form of malware fingerprinting. In the
Android operating system, Cimitile et al. [82] offered a new
approach, transforming Java bytecode into formal models
and constructing temporal logic properties to describe the
characteristic behaviour of a ransomware. The solutions of
Kanwal et al. [83] were based on searching for specific static
text strings in the binary, which can be indicative of a ransom
request screen.
Canary files, decoy files, or honeyfiles have been used in
several of the above-mentioned proposals [49], [53], [54],
[65], [72], [84], [85]. In [85], canary files were the only
detection technique proposed.
Commercial ransomware detection tools such as
CryptoStopper [86] are based on canary files, while oth-
ers [87] monitor the extensions of newly created files in
search of those used by known ransomware variants.
Studies by Cabaj and Mazurczyk [88] or by Ahmadian
et al. [89] were based on detecting and blocking the com-
munication to the ransomware C&C servers. Cabaj and
Mazurczyk [88] used OpenFlow-capable switches to inter-
cept or monitor DNS requests which were checked against
a blacklist of known C&C domain names. The proposal
of Ahmadian et al. [89] accommodated ransomware families
which generated pseudo-random domain names. It attempted
to detect DNS requests to names generated by a DGA based
on a Markov chain and a model for the frequency of alpha-
betic characters and character transitions. Commercial offer-
ings such as Cisco Umbrella [90] are also based on DNS
inspection and domain blacklisting.
V. FILE RECOVERY
We have described ransomware detection techniques capable
of detectingmalware before it starts encrypting files and some
other proposals that require witnessing ransomware action to
raise an alarm. In cases where the ransomware has already
encrypted some files before it is halted, there is some loss
of user data. In this section we describe techniques which
avoid any loss of data because they are capable of restoring
the original file content.
The desired outcome of file recovery is the last version of
file content before the encryption. Most backup policies only
recover the last backup version file, which is not necessarily
the last version the user edited. Some proposals described in
this section are capable of recovering the last edited version.
A. CRYPTOGRAPHIC RECOVERY
Files encrypted by ransomware can be recovered if the
decryption key can be obtained (obviously without paying
the ransom). Depending on the key management procedure
implemented or the encrypting functions used, this task can
be accomplished by monitoring the malware action.
For certain ransomware families, the decryption keys are
available to the public. Theywere extracted from the binary or
the ransomware used weak encryption procedures vulnerable
to cryptanalysis techniques [91], [92]. The No More Ransom
Project webpage [93] offers links to decryption tools for at
least 100 ransomware versions.
In PayBreak [94], the authors took advantage of the fact
that hybrid cryptosystems create encryption keys for a sym-
metric encryption algorithm that are used in file encryption,
although they are later encrypted using a public key whose
private key is only known by the attacker. Being present in
the infected computer, at least during file encryption, these
keys can theoretically be retrieved. The authors of [94] devel-
oped a software component that intercepted the API calls to
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session key creation functions and stored the returned keys in
a protected key vault. Using these keys, the encrypted files
were recovered. They hooked into system-provided encryp-
tion libraries and attempted to recognise statically linked
libraries using fuzzy signatures.
A similar proposal to Paybreak [94] was presented by
Kim et al. [95], where the intercepted function was used
for random number generation in the process of session key
creation. The random numbers provided were controlled by
the ransomware protection software, and by using the same
numbers, it recreated the session keys for file decryption.
B. RECOVERY FROM BACKUPS
Without an effective ransomware detection mechanism, most
enterprises resort to recovery from backups when they suffer
a ransomware attack. These backups usually do not contain
the last version of files; therefore, some data are always lost.
They also suffer the effect of work disruption during file
recovery.
Using the special writing behaviour in an SSD, a bet-
ter backup policy can be implemented. In FlashGuard [96],
Huang et al. took advantage of how SSDs perform out-of-
place write operations instead of replacing the old data with
the new content of a file. SSDs behave in this manner because
they must erase the data content before they write to those
memory cells, and the erase operation is time consuming.
Since the SSD does not erase the original data but writes to
a different memory cell, these data can be recovered if they
are read before they are erased by the SSD garbage collector.
However, this procedure does not offer the detection of ran-
somware action. Paik et al. [63] used a very similar approach,
but added ransomware detection based on the read/rewrite
patterns.
Some proposals for ransomware detection require observ-
ing the process of file encryption, and raise an alarm only
when some files have been lost. This procedure can be
improved by keeping a backup of the files being edited at the
cost of a higher disk response time to applications because
any file modification operation is intercepted to maintain a
backup.
Continella et al. [70] created a copy of a file before
allowing the requesting process to modify it. If the process
was classified as ransomware, it was halted and the files it
modified were recovered from the copied documents, which
were the most recent versions before encryption. Following a
similar procedure, in [61] the monitoring software redirected
every write request to a sparse file in a protected area with-
out changing the original file. In [60] the read/write opera-
tions were redirected only in cases of suspicious file system
activity.
Storage systems based on objects instead of files can make
objects immutable, turning write operations into the creation
of a new version of the object. Eze et al. described in [18] the
use of secure object storage to recover encrypted objects.
Both Baykara and Sekin [99] and Jin et al. [100] described
backup solutions against ransomware attacks. They created
periodic copies of protected files in either a compressed
file [99] or inside a docker container [100], adding the possi-
bility of an extra backup to a remote file server. A similar pro-
posal was presented in [101] for anAndroid operating system.
These proposals are similar to some recent commercial offer-
ings of backup solutions targeting ransomware threats. Most
solutions offer no significant difference to a usual backup
and only expose how a backup policy can solve or alleviate
the problems that result from a ransomware infection [102].
However, products like [80], [81], [103] combine the detec-
tion of ransomware action with the recovery mechanisms of
backup files.
VI. DETECTION AND PERFORMANCE RESULTS
All the proposals found in the literature presented a tradeoff
between detection results and performance. Table 4 shows
a summary of the main results extracted from these stud-
ies. In this section, we explain the content of each column
in Table 4 and highlight the main differences encountered.
Empty table cells are the result of a parameter that could have
been measured but for which no relevant data were found in
the article.
A. DETECTION RATE
The first column of Table 4 shows the percentage of ran-
somware samples detected by a system. This is the most
prevalent result presented, and most studies offered detection
results above 90%. In most cases, detection performance
was defined as the quotient between the number of samples
detected and the total number of ransomware samples, i.e.
the probability of detecting a sample. However, Zhang et al.
[68] defined detection performance as the quotient between
the number of samples detected and the sum of true and
false detections, i.e. the probability that an alarm was correct.
Karimi and Moattar [79] provided the proportion of samples
(ransomware or benign) that were correctly classified as the
closest metric. There is no homogeneous definition for this
performance result.
The detection rate alone does not provide a fair comparison
because of the different populations of ransomware samples
employed. The column ‘number of samples’ in Table 4 details
the number of ransomware samples and/or ransomware fami-
lies that were used in the tests or in the learning phase. Propos-
als such as Proposals such as 2entFOX [71] or R-Locker [85]
were capable of detecting all the offered samples but were
tested using only a few ransomware families. This was also
the case in [88], [97]. In a few studies, a single ransomware
family was tested [56], [65], making the results hardly exten-
sible. An extreme case is [51], targeting only JPEGfiles being
encrypted by TorrentLocker. Lee et al. [52] used encrypted
files in the ML training and test phases but the authors did
not specify how those files were encrypted. In these last two
cases the detection rate was not measured using ransomware
samples but encrypted files, so it is not comparable to other
articles. In most proposals, although only a few ransomware
families were detected, the methodology could be valid for
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TABLE 4. Performance and detection results presented in the literature.
other samples [79], [89] because it was not locked to a
specific behaviour in a ransomware family.
Testing a detection algorithm with a wide variety of ran-
somware families is problematic. Ransomware is volatile in
the sense that most samples become inactive after a few
months because of C&C servers being taken down. There-
fore, testing with a large sample test is not always possible,
and some proposals enjoy the simple advantage of being
developed when many new active samples are discovered.
In addition, the older a study, the less families it can be tested
against, which hinders the comparison of results.
We observed a wide range of sample sizes used in different
studies, from tens or hundreds [50], [59], [61], [67], [70],
[89] to thousands [57], [68], [75], [78]. The studies using
thousands of samples resorted to automatic download from
antivirus repositories. It is difficult to evaluate how different
these samples are and whether they represent a more diverse
population of ransomware behaviour than the set used by
a study with only tens of samples. Although the hashes of
the binaries were all different, there may be only a small
set of different behaviours for the evaluation of a detection
algorithm.
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B. FALSE POSITIVES
The second column of Table 4 shows the probability of
the detection algorithm classifying benign software as ran-
somware. In most cases, this is a lesser mistake compared to
allowing malign software to run. However, a large number
of false positives means that a user’s work will be disrupted
more often, which in turn may lead the user to disable the
detection software.
Not all studies offered a measurement of the percentage of
false positives, and those that did showed results in the single-
digits. However, the validity of the figures in this column
depends on the population of benign software behaviour that
was tested, or the population of users running the software
because of the dependency on user actions for some detection
algorithms. The column ‘‘number of user applications’’ offers
a summary of the data provided by the authors regarding the
tests that lead to false positive results. It was not always based
on the number of applications; it was based on the number of
DNS requests when the detection algorithm was based on the
traffic from this protocol.
Similar to the detection rate, the results were not easily
comparable. A few authors offered their data to encourage
reproducibility; however, no uniform testing data were found
and would be feasible only when the input information to the
detection algorithms were the same.
C. CPU IMPACT
Most proposals were based on software running on a user’s
host computer. Therefore, they required CPU and hard disk
resources. The exception was any detection solution based on
network traffic alone which could be deployed in firewalls,
network probes, or traffic inspection devices.
The column ‘‘resources required’’ provides the data on
CPU cycle consumption published by the authors. Sometimes
it was a percentage of CPU load, an increased delay in
response time, or only a qualitative result (e.g. ‘‘low’’). Not
many authors evaluated the effect of their detection approach
on computer responsiveness. However, it can be argued that
the presented implementations were research prototypes open
to performance improvement, and therefore, the results would
not be conclusive.
D. LOST FILES
Finally, some proposals detected and stopped ransomware
action before it encrypted files, while other detectors required
monitoring ransomware action (the encryption phase) to
label it as dangerous. The result was a time window
when some files could be lost before the ransomware was
detected.
The column ‘‘lost files’’ shows the data offered by the
authors on this topic. Studies with a ‘‘0’’ in this column lost no
files. In some cases, this was the result of detection prior to the
encryption phase. In other cases, the monitoring software per-
formed file backups [61], [63], [65], [70], [72] or intercepted
the disk access system calls from any unclassified software.
Once intercepted, the system calls could be redirected to a
copy of the original file.
VII. OPEN ISSUES
The panorama of ransomware families has been changing
in the last five years. They have increased their resistance
to cryptanalysis techniques more than to detection tech-
niques. Nonetheless, new strains have shown improved code
and behaviour obfuscation. For example, CTBLocker [30]
encrypts only part of a file, resulting in lower writing rates
than previous ransomware; therefore; a detection based on
disk activity may fail. GandCrab obfuscates strings used as
function call parameters [24].
The best protection in the literature is offered by a combi-
nation of detection and backup policies where the original file
can be recovered. Even if automatic detection fails, eventually
user manual detection takes place and the user finds the files
that were encrypted. The main drawback in these proposals is
the cost in CPU and disk usage. The response time to read and
write actions is increased because of backup maintenance.
Backups also take up space in the local disk. In the case
of detection failure, it is not likely that a local disk will be
capable of keeping a copy of all the encrypted files because
it will take up as much space in the backup as the original
files. In some proposals, the backup takes place in a network
volume which reduces local disk usage but increases the
configuration burden, requires a disk server, and reduces the
frequency of backups.
There is a lack of evaluation of the different proposals,
especially in their usability because of the added load to the
CPU and disk. Most proposals are proof-of-concept devel-
opments from academia and lack the optimisations needed
to reach conclusions regarding usability. The proposed algo-
rithms can be effective but not efficient and incur grave per-
formance degradation. There is a need for better evaluation
of the effects these detection algorithms have on computer
responsiveness. Proposals deployed in network equipment
or network traffic probes suffer less stringent requirements;
however, they have a more limited visibility of ransomware
action than locally installed analysis software.
As shown in Section VI, the results offered in the literature
for the different proposals were difficult if not impossible
to compare. They did not target the same ransomware fam-
ilies and presented results using different metrics. A unified
evaluation and comparison scenario is needed for a serious
reproducible research. As a first step, the list of malware
binaries should be available for comparison. This is a very
difficult condition because ransomware stops working if the
required C&C servers are taken down. As a second step, a set
of unifiedmetrics for evaluation is required. Theway of deter-
mining true and false positives and true and false negatives is
not the same. Finally, almost no proposal provided a source
code or a sufficient description of the algorithm to reproduce
its behaviour. Algorithms based on thresholds do not pro-
vide the exact procedure to measure the input information
and the exact thresholds that produce the presented values.
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Research results based on automatic learning algorithms do
not offer the output of the training, which can lead to a com-
parison of the behaviour with new malware samples. Over-
all, nowadays, comparability and reproducibility is neither
facilitated by the problem at hand nor by the way researchers
present their results.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This survey focused on the proposed algorithms for the
detection of cryptographic ransomware. We analysed 63 ran-
somware samples from 52 families to extract the character-
istic steps taken by a ransomware. From this knowledge,
we detailed the input data that detection algorithms extract
from ransomware based on each of these steps. We classified
these input data based on the point of extraction (local to the
infected machine or remotely) and whether it was extracted
before the malware ran or during its activity. The algorithms
were grouped based on this classification.
We presented a second classification of ransomware detec-
tion algorithms based not only on the input parameters used
but also on how they combine these data to reach a classifi-
cation result of either benign or malign software. In the last
years, algorithms based on ML techniques have become very
popular and have been used in more than 35% of the studies
in the literature. However, they coexisted with a large set of
heuristics and ad-hoc detection solutions.
After exploring the input data and the procedure in the
detection algorithms, we collected the evaluation and com-
parison results presented in the literature for each detection
proposal. They were scarce and difficult to compare, leav-
ing room for a more reproducible research in the field of
security.
Finally, we discussed the open issues to offer effective solu-
tions for ransomware detection or to support better research
and validation of the proposed algorithms.
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